Sometimes the best way to describe something is to see it in action.
In the following video, observe how Federer wins the two points during in the time period 1:40-2:14. These two points are an indication of the Edberg effect.
Our eyes tell us that Federer is an ice-skater: he glides over the tennis court with the precision of a pastrami slicer. His shots are well varied. First point: he comes in off a strong cross-court backhand drive. Second point, he comes in off a precise down-the-line forehand rocket. The volleys are precise. The viewer is left to think that tennis is an easy sport. Just hit a big shot, come to the net, finish off the point. Observe how composed Federer is: winning points feels easy. Of course it is not this easy!
When watching Edberg play one felt such easiness was, if not possible, at least viewable. As with Federer. There are many players who make the sport look easy. To deliver a good explanation of what the Edberg effect is, we will focus on five players.
Stefan Edberg
Roger Federer
Magnus Norman
Robin Soderling
Stanislas Wawrinka
These players are all different – in styles, physique and so on. But they share striking similarities, which are reminiscent of the success that Edberg had.
The Edberg effect
The Edberg effect can be broken down into three basic principles. Our analysis, of course, is just opinion – we accept that what we write is an imitation of reality.
Principle 1 – Remain calm
As Confucius said: life is simple but we insist on making it complicated. At the heart of what made Edberg and Federer extremely successful players, what has propelled Wawrinka into the top echelons of the sport and made him win a Major, what made Soderling defeat Nadal and Federer in Majors and what makes Norman such a good coach is the ability to stay calm regardless of a favourable or unfavourable situation.
Note the disjunction “or” between the two events “favourable situation” and “unfavourable situation”. This is like saying that the player ‘remains the same’ regardless of the situation he is in. Just won a long rally with a spectacular down the line backhand winner? Behave the same way as if you just missed the easiest volley in the world.
How was Federer feeling when he was down two sets to love against Julien Benneteau?
First instincts tell us that to pump ourselves ‘up’ at any situation. Experience comes from good judgement, which comes from bad judgement. Bad judgements usually comes from a miscalculation in our instincts.
The problem with pumping up is the after-effect. It drains energy away from you. Players who can focus longer are not prone to erratic level drops – it is common to watch a junior win a set 6-1 then lose the next by the same scoreline.
Staying calm is essential. Winning is not easy. Losing however, can be easy. By staying calm you learn to not see winning and losing as two different things – but both as a process with some random outcome that you, the player, helps to determine.
Example: Federer saving 4 set points against Roddick at Wimbledon by being patient and seeing if Roddick had the ability to really kill Federer off. Here is the Youtube link to the tiebreak. Which player looked more calm when Roddick was 6-2 up?
Example: Wawrinka losing the first set to Ferrer at the ATP World Tour Finals 2013. Wawrinka accepted the difficult battle to come in winning the match despite being a set down and eventually proceeded to win the match. Below is the video of the highlights: see how pumped up Wawrinka remains despite losing the first set.
Staying calm conserves energy. You do not need to be your best to win matches – all you need to do (in most matches) is manage your risk and play to the averages. By staying calm, you raise your average over time.
Staying calm allows you to deal with what the other player is throwing at you – are they trying out tactic X? Are they targetting my backhand? Where do they serve at 40-40? Suddenly you spot more things.
Staying calm allows you to play a purposefully ambiguous game without losing focus. There are two players who are so good at this that people sometimes forget that they are doing it – Federer and Murray. Murray has tortured opponents for years with his game, as has Federer. Their games are ambiguous in different ways: where as Federer has learned to be aggressive in different ways that take rhythm away from his opponents, Murray has learned to channel in his indifferences to be aggressive in a ‘blunt’ fashion and as a result Murray is less predictable.
Principle 2. Embrace your identity
Edberg had no business slugging away from the baseline, he won and lost at the net. Soderling cannot dream of hitting volleys like Edberg. Wawrinka will never have the Federer’s flexibility, nor will Federer ever be able to consistently generate the power Wawrinka does on his backhand.
Each player has their own unique identity. Even when players model their style on their idols, as Wilander did with Borg, the identity is never the same. That is not to say the style is different – that assertion is subject to opinion.
By embracing your identity, you play the way you know how to play. You understand the procedure well – you know when you’ll win and when you’ll lose. It may seem incredible watching Edberg making approach shots so well timed one felt that the Swede worked as a clock-maker, but the reality is Edberg hit so many approaches and volleys that the experience wasn’t so incredible to him. Similar to how we all marvel when Wawrinka launches a backhand missile down the line: incredible to everyone but Wawrinka has hit that shot enough times for it to be normal service to him.
Federer’s Australian Open 2014 campaign, barring a disappointing to Nadal, was an extreme success. The way he played against Tsonga and Murray was electric – Federer could have played that style all day. Compare it to recent Majors where he has not abided by the 3 principles (the third to shortly come), and you can see how apparent this effect is. For Federer, slugging away at the baseline is more comfortable than it was for Edberg. But Federer is supremely stubborn – and he will always have the desire to go forward and finish points off.
Soderling had similar problems until Norman calibrated his aggression. Soderling was always able to trouble top opponents – see his match in Madrid against Federer in 2006, or the longest 6-1 6-0 defeat to Nadal in Rome 2009, a month before he bested Nadal in Paris. Soderling’s problem was turning up his aggression in critical moments. Norman worked with him to fix this and before Soderling’s career fell away tragically due to illness, he was an extremely dangerous opponent. One sensed that Soderling defined himself in the big moments – Federer made mini-comebacks in their French Open 2010 match but each time a big moment came, Soderling embraced his identity and hit sledgehammers.
Principle 3. Maximise your aggression
Consider the confusing but extremely talented Gael Monfils. Monfils has called himself a ‘rat’ on the court – he chases what he is given. Monfils can also rip forehands with speeds up to 180 km/h.
To Monfils, his aggression is maximised when he is best behaved – when he is pumped up. For Monfils, ‘maximising aggression’ would be to position himself further inside the court, be more aggressive and cut out the clowning around. Implementing these changes may frustrate Monfils, make him feel unfocused or unsure of what to do in the court. Therefore by trying to maximise his aggression, he bizarrely becomes less aggressive. The concept of ‘maximising aggression’ is not trivial.
But it can be seen as follows: to maximise your aggression is to play a style of tennis that incurs minimum cost on your style and imposes maximum cost on your opponents style.
In the following video, Soderling crushes Ferrer in a clay-court match in Sweden.
Upon first impression, Soderling maximises his aggression by hitting the bell as hard as he can. On a closer inspection, see that Soderling anticipates all of Ferrer’s shots. His positioning is tidy. Rarely is he too early or too late to a shot. He hits shots into places that force Ferrer to give back weak replies. This shows how Soderling maximises his aggression: hitting hard but with care and good fitness.
Much is the same with Wawrinka, who did not know how to really maximise his aggression. His 2009 Wimbledon match against Andy Murray is a good example: Wawrinka had the technical capability to match Murray in all departments but fell short in the tight moments. By calming him and giving him direction on the court, Norman has made Wawrinka a nightmare to deal with: when moments get tight Wawrinka gets better.
Conclusion
To understand the Edberg effect is to understand the similarity in thinking required for Jackson Pollock to paint his messy abstract pieces and Leonardo da Vinci his timed masterpieces. There is a clear philosophy: stay calm amidst all the madness, embrace who you are as a person and maximise your potential. Naturally, these are all easier said than done.
The aim of this article is to promote a new approach to playing tennis: the levels approach.
It will shortly be defined. The motivation for learning this approach is that it offers the following:
Offers a new insight into watching and playing tennis further than the layman approach of just watching the game and seeing it how it is.
Allows you to make predictions on player’s (and your own) performances and see how player’s react to pressure in matches.
Takes the frustration out of playing tennis: this approach explains how to deal with unforced errors, double faults, and further negative
features and how to understand them in the greater perspective.
This approach came to mind after a discussion with a coach during the 2012 Wimbledon match, Lukáš Rosol versus Rafael Nadal. To recall how well Rosol played, the highlights of some his best rallies are linked below.
Towards the end of the first set, as we discussed the momentum swing going from Rosol to Nadal and as a result, Nadal taking the first set, the coach says “if Rosol loses this set, he will win the match”.
This seemed bizarre. Surely Rosol should win the set to win the match? In his eyes it was different, when asked to explain his comment he offered the following explanations:
Nadal gave his maximum effort to take the first set and in doing so, took a physical toll on him and his ability to play later on in the match. Rosol was playing well but as he said himself , he was in a trance and had no problem about worrying what would happen later on if he immediately exerted maximum effort: his big serves would give him free points which would allow him to recoup the mental energy required to win rallies against Nadal, which is difficult to do so, as explained by the article here.
When Nadal loses sets his effort increases as the match develops, to not allow the opponent any rhythm and to make winning against him much harder. But after a hard fought set in which he was out hit yet still captured it, it is expected for Nadal to think slightly differently (even if just about every commentator says that Nadal plays one point at a time) as to how he would had he lost the first set. As Rosol was in a trance, this made no real difference and his motivation stayed.
Rosol “handled” Nadal’s all by losing a close set. He understood what was successful and what could be improved. On the other hand, Nadal won the set despite being out hit and at times, out played. Nadal was not getting completely schooled, therefore it is expected for him to have not been so worried about his approach as he took the set.
As the match developed, Rosol kept hitting big and overcame Nadal’s efforts. This can be seen as some sort of a level (a position on some quantity). Rosol’s level withstood Nadal’s level. Nadal’s level could not stand Rosol’s level and when he tried to do so, the match was still out of his hands.
This example gives a good guide to what the levels approach is. Formally, a player’s performance in a match is based on many factors – footwork, movement, groundstrokes, serving, physical condition, mental ability. These factors combined into a performance give a player a level: an explanation on how the player performs.
We can show this graphically by considering two axes: the time of a match and the performance level of a player. We will look at some examples and analyse.
Example 1: Constant Level
The “min” refers to a players lowest possible performance level and “max” refers to their best. Clearly if they can play at their best throughout a duration of a match – they should produce their best possible performance. Note that as time increases, which means factors such as the crowd, opponent’s strategy, tiredness, weather and so on all change, the level of performance stays the same hence the name “constant”. This is what tennis players dream of – to not be reactive to any situation.
For all practical purposes this is unrealistic, rarely do we (or professional tennis players) perform our best for a whole period of time at our job or any activity. We make mistakes, perform tasks with some worries or trouble and so on. Does this mean perfection does not exist? This question is hard to answer. But we understand that the image above is realistic. The best we can hope is to keep playing a good level through out a match. This is done best by preparation (which will itself be a future article).
Specific player:
Lleyton Hewitt is a player who maintained his level through out matches. His levels approach (to stay consistent, recall that other players of Hewitt’s height have been far more aggressive) brought him two majors and the world number one rankings as a teenager. This has several implications.
Clearly his levels approach is successful and aiming your level to not go up and down too much is a strategy worth pursuing. When Larry Stefanski coached Andy Roddick, many fans complained that Roddick had become a pusher – that his big forehand had gone and he was playing far too tactical. These opinions can be explained by Stefanski making Roddick’s level far more consistent. In his approach, he had less up – less big shots, but he also had less down and for Roddick there were many more downs: his awful slice approach shots, weak “puffer” backhand shots, bad court positioning and so on. His level became more consistent and with an increased physical fitness, he enjoyed a brief spell of extreme success in 2009 before players adjusted to his tacics.
Hewitt achieved so much at a young age – his approach is beneficial to young players as they do not have to figure out how to manage their big aggressive games. Roger Federer gives a great explanation to the difference between him and Hewitt in this video, in 2002
This level approach also has shortcomings. In fact any level approach has shortcomings (just like how it has benefits), it is how the levels approach matches up against another player’s level approach. This determines success.
Does my levels approach, say Hewitt like, being consistent, beat an approach of someone like Alexandr Dolgopolov, which is up and down to the maximum?
Example 2: Up -> Down Level
This approach seems obvious. A player starts out well and his level is good: he has cut out the negatives in his game. As time proceeds he cannot keep this level up or the opponent starts to play well and he begins to decline – his level drops. Then the opponent is in a better position and surely wins the match?
That type of thinking is certainly possible – a five set match in which one player is up two sets to love and loses three sets to two can be a good example of this level, but it is not the only explanation. This is a subtly with a player’s level: perceiving is half of the analysis.
What if the player is facing an opponent like Hewitt, who keeps his level constant? Then it is not immediately obvious why the level drops. Even more absurd: it is possible for a player to win a match even as his level drops incredibly. A good example is the following match between Roger Federer and Robin Soderling at the 2009 US Open. Federer’s form in the first set is incredible but it begins to drop. He closes out the match in the fourth set, despite Soderling playing very well in the fourth set and Federer not capturing the form in the first set.
This happens as the position the player with the high level has put himself is in dominance: the opponent must raise his level (to some extent) to come back where as the player is allowed to drop his level as long he wins the match and wins the important points.
Example 3: Crazy
The levels here may seem crazy – you have somebody playing well, then going downhill, suddenly they are hit by lightning and improve, then fade away again before a smoother final change. It seems a bit crazy.
The reality is that we really play like this – no one (unless you’re a young Ernests Gulbis or Marat Safin) wants to lose a match. We try our best. Our levels dip in response to the other person. This examples shows what a normal match looks like – it can be a hard fought 7-6 7-6 win or a crazy 6-0 0-6 6-0 thriller.
We conclude with how you can use the levels approach to understand tennis further and how it can be used for your own game.
When watching matches look at the player’s game styles and what they have to offer – look at how they are handling their level (observe how Andy Murray swearing drags his level down). Then if a player can handle his level whilst the other is playing better, they can win a match without being the best. Nadal is a great example – he can take the best a player gives to him, give them a few points where they play their best but soak up all the other points. He accepts an opponent playing some unbelievable points and allows his level to dip at these moments. Then his level raises again and he keeps asking for his opponent to remain at their higher level.
Understanding that your double faults and unforced errors and other frustrations bring your level down and make your opponent’s life easier makes you appreciate to keep your emotions in check. Further, there can only be an improvement in your level after you start cutting out the frustrations. Your game is vastly improved as you begin to consistently increase your level. If an opponent is playing well at some point and all appears to be hopeless – remember the levels approach. He may win that set 6-0 and completely dominate you, but you may scrape the next set 7-6. Absolute opposites can become near similarities by understanding how to shift your level.
This means you take what you are good at, make it so that as your level drops, that it remains good. New tactics become ingrained, new shots become regular and new found confidence becomes the norm.
P.S. I would like to say thank you to all the people who have read my blog, all views and comments are appreciated, I read them all. If you would like me to do a post on a specific topic – just mention it by leaving a comment.
A male player with a lethal forehand, an even better backhand, great movement, amazing footwork, comfortable at the net, able to use a reactive baseline style which brings success in the modern game (explained here), combined with a great serve and a great return of serve.
How do you beat him?
Well, until Roger Federer did so at Roland Garros, nobody had beaten Djokovic in 2011 – the Serbian’s 40+ match winning streak was and still is amazing, defeating Nadal in 5 finals on three different surfaces and defeating Federer in a semi final of a Major add huge credibility to his streak, and for a while, many believed he was simply unbeatable.
It took a sensational performance from Federer to defeat Djokovic, one of the greatest in his career – Federer has a tendency to play his best tennis in the semi final of a Major – previous destructions at Australian Open semi finals include Roddick in 2007, Roddick in 2009 and Tsonga 2010, Djokovic in US Open 2008 and 2009, etc, thus it was not completely surprising that his best tennis of the year came during the semi final of the second Major of the year.
What was surprising is how intelligent Federer played, and how complete he has become with his tactics. Despite being past his peak, Federer delivered a stunning performance, one reeking of a proactive, aggressive style that has become rare to watch in the modern game. Federer’s proactive style is in huge contrast to fellow top players (Nadal, Murray and Djokovic just to name a few) that makes Federer so much more enjoyable to watch for many fans.
So how did Federer defeat Djokovic?
1. Federer took time away from Djokovic, made him move laterally AND vertically on the court. (the images below will explain this further)
2. He used his backhand extremely well – Djokovic was very frustrated during this match because he could not break down Federer’s backhand, as opposed to the 2011 Australian Open and the 2010 US Open where either Federer’s forehand or backhand eventually broke down in extended rallies. On this certain match, Federer’s groundstrokes were brilliant, when his game from the back-court is on, as Djokovic experienced, it is very, very difficult to play your game as Federer asks many questions with his serve, groundstrokes and movement. Federer hit a lot of backhand topspin down-the-line winners in this match, in fact Federer’s topspin backhand down-the-line was arguably the key shotin this match (each player’s serve being more important), and as explained before, hitting down-the-line can be very effective in any match, regardless of opposition, which makes it a proactive tactic to use, which fits well with Federers game.
3. Federer defended extremely well, often slicing his backhand cross-court to the service line, which made Djokovic have to “reach” in the court and stretch down for the ball to return it, not many players can use this short slice, it was not surprising to see Djokovic often struggle with it.
4. He served very well. Serving well is arguably the most important thing to do in a tennis match (if not one of the most important), and doing it benefits to reducing unforced errors from reduced pressure, hitting more winners due to having shorter returns from the opponent, and more concentration to focus on your opponents games than your own, reducing pressure.
The images below should help extend the analysis, explaining how the 4 points in a more clear and extended manner with diagrams and notations.
Point 1
In the image above, Federer slices a backhand cross-court to Djokovic’s backhand, the positioning of the shot is quite shallow – it’s near the service line, this would usually lead people to believe that Federer is being defensive, but he is actually using an attacking tactic here.
By slicing low, short and aggressively (not a floating slice) to Djokovic’s backhand, he makes the Serbian come inside the baseline, which again seems advantageous for the Serbian, but this exposes more of the court to Federer as Djokovic is not behind the baseline anymore, as well as not having the extra time or space to prepare for his groundstrokes for more power and accuracy, by staying inside the basline, Djokovic would be forced to hit on the rise in a groundstroke rally, thus this tactic is used to “pull” the Serbian into the net, and to sort of distort his fluency from the back of the court.
But how does it matter later on in the point? What effect does this slice have?
Here you can see how low Djokovic has to get to slice the ball back, his footwork and technique needs to be exceptional to hit a slice (a topspin is out of the question in this case) that Federer cannot attack from either the slice floating too high to Federer’s hitting zone, or Djokovic’s court positioning.
The grey rectangle represents where Djokovic is more dangerous and more importantly, “comfortable” on the tennis court – it is impossible to blast through him through the grey rectangle shown in the diagram, his tall height, great footwork and consistent forehand + backhand means you have to move the Serbian extremely horizontally to try and hit winners to the corners.
In the image above, Federer hits a topspin backhand to the black rectangle, meaning he is moving Djokovic away from his most comfortable position on the court (the centre of the court).
Djokovic now returns a topspin backhand cross-court, an identical shot to the one Federer did, however the grey rectangle now represents where Federer is most comfortable on the tennis court – Federer is the best defender (with Nadal and Sampras close below) in the game when it comes to defending the backhand side (his left side), despite his backhand being weaker than his forehand, the court positioning, technique on his shots, footwork and variety he has from his left side (where he can go inside out/in with the forehand on top of using the backhand) are far more than to his right, where the cross-court or the down-the-line forehand are his only options.
Federer is aided by having an exceptional slice, which means moving him laterally to his left can be useless unless he is faced with heavy topspin (think Nadal’s forehand), but even then, Federer often runs around his backhand or hits a down-the-line backhand to counter this tactic, thus as you can see in the above image, Djokovic is tempting fate by leaving the whole court to his right free by hitting to a position Federer is already in (Djokovic was not in the position he is in the above image from image 3, as opposed to Federer, who is in the same position in image 3 and image 4 ( the image above) ).
With all the free space, Federer hits a clean down-the-line topspin backhand winner.
This pattern is repeated in the match perhaps 30+ times and nearly all the time Djokovic loses. This pattern emerged in just the third game of the whole match – that Federer hit a down-the-line backhand winner so early tells you he had a clear strategy from early on.
At 6-6 in the tie-breaker, Federer hits another cross-court slice, however unlike the one in image 1, this slice is more deep, much higher than the service line.
Djokovic can opt for a down-the-line backhand, which he is so comfortable with, to avoid losing balance and court positioning (and the point) from Federer inevitably hitting down-the-line with his backhand if he returns the shot cross court.
Federer now hits a down the line backhand, Djokovic has to move laterally to his weaker wing to recover the shot.
And indeed he does; however now Federer hits an even more risky shot, an inside-out down-the-line backhand, which wrong-foots Djokovic; Federer is a tough match-up for any modern baseliner to deal with because he has so much variety.
Djokovic now has to recover this shot and you can see the clear wrong-footing Federer has done; Djokovic has partly lost balance and lost his position completely/
Later on in the point Federer makes Djokovic completely lose his balance on top of court positioning.
Although it may seem just like one point won by Federer, doing it loses Djokovic’s timing; he has to continuously “recover” shots just to get back into a rally, it makes the timing much harder for when he is in control of a rally due to just how rare it is (for him to be dominating, not Federer).
Point 3
At 4-5, 0-30, it is crucial Djokovic wins this point to not give Federer 3 break-back points, yet once again, the Serbian fell to the 1-2 combination Federer used so many times, the cross-court backhand slice/topspin (or cross-court inside-out forehand), and the backhand down-the-line, this shot in particular was a clean winner and effectively ended any chance of Djokovic taking the match into a fifth set from his own serve.
This different angle shows the cross-court rally, where both players are camped to their backhand side, one hits back to the other player (Djokovic), where as the other is hitting to the space (Federer).
By the time the ball has landed in Djokovic’s court (and if you look clearly, Federer’s winner wasn’t the most powerful or deep either; it just cleared the service line), the point has already ended.
Point 4
But what would happen if Djokovic started camping a little more to his forehand side, or started to prepare to move to his forehand side from a cross-court shot to Federer’s backhand, surely Federer would not do so much damage with his down-the-line backhand?
Unfortunately, this is where the proactive style Federer employs means it is impossible to beat him, by now looking to move to his (Djokovic’s) right, he now leaves an open hole to his left where he can be wrong-footed by an inside-out shot (arguably Federer’s best sub-forehand shot).
Djokovic is on his tip-toes on this image expecting a down-the-line shot from Federer’s forehand, but Federer “checks” the ball, leaves it for a more seconds (which is very risky and requires exquisite timing) and hits an inside-out forehand to Djokovic’s backhand.
For proof on Djokovic’s change of identity when returning Federer’s shots; the image above clearly shows how he was not prepared for the shot to his backhand side and is making a recovery shot. This leaves Federer with a huge space.
Federer duly converts with an inside-in forehand winner.
This leads to almost a double-edge sword for Djokovic in baseline rallies; either he lets Federer hit down-the-line backhands continuously and hope Federer misses them or stops hitting DTL BHs, or he starts moving to his right and is now open to the inside-out forehand wrong-footing shot.
Surface
Overall, this match was played on a quicker than usual clay surface, the tennis balls were reported to be much quicker than usual, Greg Rudeski labelled them as “pellets”, the conclusion on this is that quicker surfaces and quicker tennis balls definitely aided Federer more than Djokovic here; his serve was more damaging (despite Djokovic being taller, Federer has a better serve) than at the Australian Open, Dubai or Indian Wells, this meant he could focus on the return games more, Federer is known for being awful at converting break points; his big serve let him focus on Djokovic’s games more than Federer’s.
The statistics from the match help aid this point, Federer hit 18 aces on a clay-court.
A Matter Of A Few Points
It is important to note, despite Federer playing extremely well, Djokovic also played a very good match, a match which was very close and could have been decided in a different manner (Djokovic winning) by perhaps only a few different factors. This article shouldn’t be see as an article in which Federer is receiving constant praise for his game-style, had Djokovic won the analysis would have been on the inefficiencies and problems Federer had, despite the match being very close and Federer most likely employing the same tactics as this article shows, this is very important as it shows how during a modern tennis match, often the correct strategies are being used by both players – just one player is adapting to the surface better, feels more “motivated”, etc, it is these little things that can make the difference.
Aggression
Djokovic has defeated Nadal five times in 2011 – at times he has toyed with the Spaniard, one of the reasons he can do this is because he finds it easy to be aggressive against Nadal (aka it is in his own hands).
Against Federer (Tsonga is also a good example) however it is different. It is much more difficult to be aggressive against him in comparison to players such as Nadal. Federer has more variety and thus you need to find different ways to be aggressive, his low-slice means it is very hard for anyone to be aggressive against him as the slice aims to take out aggressive shots from the other player (how can you hit an aggressive shot when the ball is 3-5 cm off the floor?).
This was different in the Australian Open semi final – where Federer was the one who found it very difficult to be aggressive against Djokovic. Difference from that match and this match? Federer served lights out in Paris and very poorly in Melbourne.
Patterns
With both players comfortable hitting cross-court and down-the-line with both wings (Djokovic more comfortable hitting down-the-line with his backhand and Federer more comfortable hitting down-the-line with his forehand), the winner of the point, at times, came down to which player had the first opportunity to hit the aggressive shot – and even then, with the remarkable defensive ability both players have, often the aggressive shot was counter-punched very aggressively, at times (Djokovic in particular) either player mystically lost the point after being in control of it due to the other’s remarkable defensive ability.
The current “Big 4” (or Big 3, if you count Slam winners only), are very different players; whilst they all have big serves and are comfortable on all surfaces; they have different techniques, Murray has arguably the worst forehand of the top 4 whilst Djokovic has arguably the best backhand of the top 4, Federer with the best volleys and Nadal with the best mentality and consistency (although Djokovic has started to challenge this with his hugely impressive run this year).
However – with all the key differences, the Big 4 unite with one thing; they are all amazing defenders on a tennis-court, what is remarkable is that they defend differently.
Murray defends well by making opponents hit aggressive shots time after time which usually result in unforced errors, he does this technique-wise by hitting cross-court a lot when in a defensive position and using slice on his backhand to add some variety.
Nadal defends by slowly pummelling the opponent with his forehand and eventually controlling the point, or (less frequent now than say in 2006) by making the opponent hit a risky net approach or go for an aggressive shot from a shoulder-high tennis ball, which many players do not have the footwork required to aggressively attack.
However Djokovic and Federer defend in a more “attacking” sense.
Federer at times will just go for the big, risky shot when outside the second week of a Major and accepts the unforced errors that come.
When he does need to defend however – he does so by using his brilliant cross-court backhand slice, his more rare inside out backhand slice (see the image below) or by wrong-footing the opponent (90% of the time it’s with his forehand). The key is that he slices with his backhand very well when in a defensive position and looks to attack in creative ways with his forehand to change the point around so he can control it.
When a match is completely out of Federer’s hands (his 2 last meetings at Majors with Del Potro, last meeting with Berdych and last meeting with Soderling), he starts adopting Murray’s tactics and essentially hopes the other person misses, in these matches, Federer usually looks his poorest and most vulnerable to being beaten.
Djokovic has perhaps the best defense – he uses Federer, Nadal and Murray’s defensive attributes combined into one.
Thus it was interesting to see just how effective Federer’s defense was in comparison to a player who is more complete defensively (Djokovic).
At the ripe-old age of 30, Federer may not have the legs or superb agility that Djokovic now has (and that Federer once did), but his defensive game-plan was very effective; slice aggressively cross-court with his backhand and look to attack with his forehand in many creative manners. Having a very clear, if slightly simple, game-plan, Federer knew what he had to do and did it very well; Djokovic is a more complete defender and thus had more options and perhaps he found it slightly difficult to know which shot to go for.
At times Djokovic seemed to be lost in what to do in the rally and at these times he just peppered Federer’s backhand; this tactic is not limited to Djokovic, Nadal and Murray have used this tactic effectively very well against Federer.
However consistently hitting the ball to his backhand meant Federer started hitting down-the-line more – even earlier on in the match (as the first couple of images show) Federer was keen to hit down-the-line with his backhand, this was not a great match to pepper Federer’s backhand due to Federer being consistent with his groundstrokes. Federer is known for shanking (mis-hitting) his backhand and forehand in tight matches (he hit a huge mishit in the fourth set to almost lose it) or/and when he is not playing well, today Federer very rarely shanked or mishit any groundstrokes, when he does this it makes him exceptionally hard to break down (and he was similar against Nadal in the final, playing a superb first set up to 5-2).
Perhaps this increase in groundstroke form was related to him serving so well, Federer has a tendency to complete a whole service game in around (or even less!) the one minute mark, today against Djokovic he couldn’t complete service games so quickly due to the great returning ability of Djokovic, but several service games, at tight moments, were quickly pulled away from the Serbian by great serving from Federer.
This is very similar to how Djokovic “stole” the Australian Open 2008 and 2011 matches from Federer and how Federer stole the US Open 2007 final from Djokovic. Great serving at crucial moments to snub the moments when the opponent had a chance to break or had a chance to get a chance to break (such as being 0-30 on a service game).
Boundaries
Overall, this match is probably the highest level of ball-striking you will see in 2011 (yet); the Fognini-Montanes match at Roland Garros may have been more dramatic and climatic, but had several errors, lapses of concentration and lack of variety of play from both players. This match was never going to have that – Djokovic is playing the best tennis of his life, Federer was the player many would look at for the errors and concentration lapses.
Djokovic has beaten just about everyone this year. Federer’s superb, proactive performance went against all kinds of theories (one handed backhand breaking down after sustained pressure, just to name one foolish theory some have collected), it has pushed the boundaries of men’s tennis, similar to how the 2008 Wimbledon Final did – the difference is in that match to this match? Federer played dreadfully from the baseline yet served brilliantly, in this match he played excellent from the baseline and served lights-out.
“For so long people have just taken what I do for granted. It is not easy to do year-in, year-out, to win Grand Slams and be No. 1.”
This quote comes from Pete Sampras, one of the greatest players in the tennis game. We have witnessed complete domination in these last couple of years on the men’s tour from Federer and Nadal; they’ve won every Grand Slam since 2004, bar a few (Gaudio, Safin, Djokovic, Del Potro, etc), yet just like Pete put it, we haven’t fully appreciated just how good Federer and Nadal have been – Federer for staying injury-free for so long and winning so many Majors while playing a beautiful style of tennis, while Nadal’s results on clay have been unbelievable; we’re not stupid as tennis observers, we are quick to adore Federer’s forehand or Nadal’s forehand, yet it is the Spaniard’s mindset, as the Swiss’s, that is truly the spectacular object that defines the two as the best – just like Sampras.
“The difference of great players is at a certain point in a match they raise their level of play and maintain it. Lesser players play great for a set, but then less. “
This is another quote from Sampras, yet we know this; we’ve seen countless times when Federer, Nadal or Sampras raised their games at the biggest moments in sport – but what is never talked about is how, or how they think towards getting there, how have they been raised to play decent for a set, hold out for a tie-breaker, and win it, and subsequently, win a match? Countless times Nadal has been out-hit by opponents such as Djokovic or Soderling or even Murray to an extent, yet at the most crucial stage, the big decider, he comes out on top, it is this sparkling mentality that truly defines a tennis player – not their forehand or backhand, and it’s a shame tennis players are judged by technical ability and not their mindset to the game.
Can you consistently stay in top-shape? Can you motivate yourself to play your best tennis despite your family falling to pieces? Can you stay in shape despite having mononucleosis? Can you close out a match despite your coach and friend passing away, while being affected? Nadal, Federer and Sampras all handled these issues, yet lesser, or to an extent, normal players, would have been set-back.
It’s the ability to ride through – to consistently face new situations, to consistently adapt to different environments, no matter how good or bad, it’s about having the determination to play even when you are physically or technically at your best that defines you as a player who has a champion mindset and is different to the rest.
Sampras had his nemesis in the form of Kraijcek as well as others, Federer has his obvious nemesis in Nadal, and the Spaniard doesn’t have a clear nemesis; Federer and Sampras promote a proactive style which usually only 1 or 2 players can beat, Nadal’s is reactive and thus while more effective, more players can beat it. Yet it’s the audacitiy, it’s the pure mental strength, that is required, to face a nemesis, to look them in the eye, and to understand that your style isn’t suited to them – yet to still believe you can win, to still believe you will win, which must create extreme pressure – but to handle it so well, and to consistently do so.
This is what makes a champion.
“It could get into my mind. I could start thinking, ‘I can’t play against this guy, his game doesn’t suit me’. I could start accepting the fact that I have been losing against him, but that would be a bad thing for me to do.”
This is a quote from Federer on Nadal – and look at the paragraph above, Federer does not accept a losing mentality against the Spaniard – he is fully confident and positive.
Sampras showed this against the talented Richard Kraijcek, it is hard to make assumptions about what Sampras was thinking when he was down 2-6 in the tiebreaker at such an important match, yet the idea of him fully believing he could win it, confident in his physical and technical ability to do so, that is baffling; it seems counter-intuitive, you find yourself 2-6 down, 1 point down from losing a crucial set; yet at this point is when you are most emotional, most fired-up. Federer was similarly down 2-6 to Roddick in another tie-break – had Federer lost that tie-break he would have been down two sets to love to a Roddick who’s serve was nearly unbreakable on that day – 1 point from loss, essentially; it is when we look back at this we see just how often tennis matches are judged not by serve, forehand or fitness, but what the players think, feel and how they execute.
(this is perhaps the most extreme example of the champion mindset; Nadal was playing poor yet he still dug deep, deep, and won the match)
It’s the ability to not see extreme wind as not a problem that will affect your baseline game negatively, rather to see it as a challenge; to conquer it, it’s about being able to consistently beat new opponents, time and time again. This is a champion mindset – it is the pure belief that you can win, it is easily perceived as arrogance and delusion, but on a more subtle analysis, it isn’t related to arrogance at all, rather more to flair and determination, why should believing you can conquer your opponent be seen as arrogance?
It’s about going to your weakest surface and comfortably defeating players who are more adept to the surface than you are, it’s the ability to make these amazing records and statistics (23 Grand Slam semi finals in a row, 81 matches won on clay, 8 consecutive finals in a Major, etc) that show just how dominant a player is. It is rare and often it takes time for a player to fully be a champion – Pete Sampras and Roger Federer are brilliant examples of this, while Nadal’s learning curve was much quicker, yet all three players have a champion mindset and all three have faced countless situations – Sampras vomitting in a Major (live in the match) and still winning; Nadal playing with severe blisters; Federer playing in a windy match against a player who is taller and hits a bigger serve. As difficult as they were, each player buckled down, exerted a huge amount of mental strength, pure determination, and won.
And it is this – the ability to spark something from nothing, when you’re not playing well or when the conditions are completely against you; when the crowd is rooting the opposing player, the ability to find something deep inside. You’re not witnessing just a tennis player – you’re witnessing a champion. Sport is the black board on which human excellence and creativity can be written, when tennis fans see this, we truly adore watching tennis for the beautiful sport it is.
Hitting a little green ball with a racquet over a net and the ball not being returned by an opponent seems so simple. Yet with years and years of different personalities in the game, we have different styles, ranging from counter-punchers (Hewitt, for the most part of his career, Chang, Simon), aggressive baseliners (Safin, Soderling, Tsonga, etc), S&V players (Sampras, Edberg, etc). In theory, we could make a Venn diagram to show what the styles were (the 2 missing spaces are not covered because it is pointless to categorize someone S&V who also counter-punches, it doesn’t really serve a purpose other than just a match strategy):
For a long, long time, tennis fans have known that the “all-court” or “complete” player is the one hardest to beat; and the theory is correct when we consider for one to be a “complete” or “all-court” player, they must have: having determination, a great serve + backhand + forehand and good fitness and good agility on all surfaces is generally what qualifies players such as Federer above others.
But how else do we explain cases such as Richard Gasquet, who has reached a semi final on a major grass tournament (Wimbledon), reached 2 Master Series finals on hard-court and quarter finals of the US Open, and reached a Master Series final on clay, too, yet Gasquet is a mentally fragile player with a forehand that sometimes lacks penetration or power, yet he still qualifies as a complete player, for he is sufficient on all surfaces. There are several other players who are just like Gasquet, who play well in all-courts and generally can be aggressive and counter-punch at the same time -> Nadal, Djokovic, Murray are proficient on all surfaces, as are Soderling, Monfils, Haas, Ferrero, or if we go back in time, Lendl, Agassi, etc, but these are not complete or all-court players, they are modern baseliners.
When watching Lendl-Borg compared to watching Sampras-Lendl, Lendl tended to be more aggressive against Sampras, he wasn’t afraid to just push the ball back against Borg and play defensive cross-court tennis, as the follow video shows.
Lendl was perhaps the first to promote a heavy baseline approach, yet the idea of a modern baseliner has only took place in the last 10 years or so, and thus we examine what a modern baseliner is, why they are coming now and not 20-50 years ago.
A player who can apply consistent controlled aggression (heavy inside-out forehands, powerful DTL backhands, are just 2 strokes a player who can hit aggressively, will hit with no problem), who can apply the finesse of the superb fitness required for long clay-court grinding matches, and a player who can apply the defensive, reactive-style of a counter-puncher would count as a modern baseliner. Essentially, a versatile baseliner.
There are numerous examples to give, however one of the best definitions of a modern baseliner is Andy Murray, in the first video he employs a heavy S&V style on the fast-courts of Paris to beat David Nalbandian, yet on the second video where he beats Federer in the Shanghai final, he uses the pace on Federer’s groundstrokes to generate winners and by consistently making Federer hit aggressive shots, it results in a lot of unforced errors, on the third video, Murray beats Nalbandian on a different court by just being aggressive from his serve, finishing anything mid-court with his forehand and using the backhand DTL to make winners, 3 styles in 3 matches . Murray does it so well, you cannot well if he is a S&V player (first video), a counter-puncher (second video), or an aggressive baseliner (third video).
Djokovic employed a heavy aggressive approach against Lu in his 2010 QF Wimbledon match and won in straight sets, yet he played a counter-punching baseline game against Berdych in the semi finals and lost in straight sets.
Another question must be asked, why have modern baseliners such as Djokovic and Nadal only popped up now, and not 30 years ago?
The answer lies in the change of the default style, many years ago the usual style (99% of the time) was Serve & volley, and with heavy domination of the net, skip to now, and the baseline approach is the way to be successful, thus the reason for modern baseliners existing now is for 2 main reasons: 1) the courts are slower, which promote staying back on the court to win more points, there are more styles and ideas applicable to staying at the back of the court than the front and more importantly 2) if everyone uses a heavy-baseline approach, players who are versatile and can apply many strategies will be the ones who succeed, with baseline tennis growing stronger and stronger, it takes more and more time for a modern baseliner to truly exist.
So keep in mind, when watching Nadal push against player A with around 10 unforced errors in a whole match, then hit aggressively and hit over 30 unforced errors against player B, you’re not necessarily watching a player with differing levels of confidence, you’re watching a player who is employing different strategies for different opponents, which is essentially reactive-tennis (responding to a situation, such as choosing to S&V like Murray did against Nalbandian in the first video, rater than play your usual game, which for Murray is counter-punching, which could be proactive), reactive tennis is more pragmatic, yet more successful
Out of the current top 4 in Men’s Singles, Murray, Nadal and Djokovic all play pragmatic, reactive tennis, it is only Federer who uses a proactive style. From this, a valid opinion would be that reactive tennis is more successful than proactive, that responding to different situations with different strategies is better than having one main strategy for all situations, but we are only looking at 4 players from a million, thus the sample is too small to have any real stance as being proof.
What do Caroline Wozniacki and Roger Federer have in common?
It would seem odd to compare Wozniacki, a heavy counter-punching baseliner with no Grand Slams to her name, to Federer, an aggressive baseliner with 16 to his name, but both showed a similar mindset to approaching their matches yesterday; one of a champion.
Playing in the wind can be difficult; Soderling and Cibulkova didn’t calibrate their games to the wind, Cibuvolka in particular kept going for big shots time after time again; and the errors came. Wozniacki was happy to retrieve the ball and not join in the frustration of her opponent.
At times, Wozniacki was even smiling as the heavy wind disrupted the match; she loves playing tennis and saw this as a “challenge”, she didn’t show much emotion on court (barring one moment) and was business-like, Federer, was similar. A usual player might see playing in the wind as “difficult” and their confidence might suffer, Federer and Wozniacki on the other hand, saw this as a challenge; an opportunity to play differently to their usual game. The champion sees the benefits in all situations, the pessimist sees all the possible failures in a situation. Ask yourself, was Wozniacki or Federer even thinking about “losing” today? That’s a champion mindset.
Federer’s quotes after the match “”By now, I see playing in the wind as a challenge—an opportunity to play differently. It’s not easy, you know. . . It’s cold, it feels like the wind’s blowing through your ears. I used to dislike it so much that I’ve been able to turn it around, and now I actually enjoy it.”
An opponent hits a backhand (righty to righty) to your backhand; you have, in classical tennis theory, 2 options; go cross-court or down the line. Count in modern day tactics, and you have many more options; hit a drop shot, run around your backhand to hit a powerful inside-out forehand, or hit a low slice down the middle that isn’t quite a drop-shot yet it doesn’t go so deep either, to cause an opponent to make a forced error. There are many more, but these are the essentials from traditional and modern tennis.
Yet of all the options above, it is hitting down the line that is perhaps the most effective (with reasons why) and this is a short guide on when, how and why to hit down-the-line backhands against your opponents, at any level, amateur, semi pro, or even professional.
When -> If you are inside the baseline, you should be looking to take the cross-court ball earlier than usual to hit a DTL (down the line) backhand; the reason for doing it inside the baseline rather than outside is that your chances of making an error are generally less due to being closer to the net, which goes from a straight line to a little dip back to a straight line, this is why a cross-court shot is a “percentage shot”, doing a DTL is more riskier, but when you are inside the baseline, you not only are taking it earlier which means you are generating more pace, but you can see the court more and you’re able to hit with more precision as you can see the court more clearly!
How? Well the technique is often over-looked when hitting down the line, it’s all about exquisite footwork, for either one handed or two handed, getting ready very early with your feet planted towards hitting down-the-line, meaning if you’re a righty and one handed, your right foot should be far more to the left of your body than if you were hitting a cross-court shot.
Why? Andy Murray was destroyed by Federer in the Australian Open 2010 final by often hitting to his backhand which allowed Federer to get into a comfortable position for their baseline rallies, yet in their recent Roger’s Cup encounter, by hitting down-the-line with his backhand; he pushed Federer back and won the match. Hitting down the line makes the receiving player feel uncertainty; is he going to hit back to me or down the line? When I go cross-court do I need to put more power otherwise he’ll cream a down-the-line backhand winner? It is a tactic that offers variety and is designed to beat all-kinds of players; from offensive baseliners (Federer) to defensive, counter-punching baseliners (Nadal).
Look at these two highlight packages and notice how many times Murray (in the first) and how many times Federer (in the second) hit down the line with their backhands; both are on different surfaces, yet both caused Federer and Nadal, respectively, troubles in their best surfaces (Federer is statistically superior on hard court than on grass, while Nadal’s favourite and best surface is clay) and caused them to lose. Hitting down the line differs you from other players; in a line of 30 000 Average Joes playing tennis, you want to be that 1 or 2% who can utilise this tactic in every single match.
The third video shows Safin using the backhand down the line effectively against Federer; Roger is placed to the left of the court as he is expecting a cross-court backhand at an early stage of a rally, Safin knowing this, does an unpredictable, yet exquisite-timed backhand down the line to win the point.
Tennis Analysis 